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Irish Constitutional law recognises the horizontal operation of constitutional 
rights. The doctrine of horizontality refers to the application of constitutional rights to 
private relationships. Constitutional rights can be applied to private relationships 
either directly or indirectly. Nonetheless, dissatisfaction has been expressed over 
developments (or lack of developments) in this area of law in Ireland for a variety of 
reasons. This article will focus on dissatisfaction raised on the basis of a 
pronouncement on horizontality made by the Irish judiciary in Hanrahan v  Merck 
Sharp & Dohme (Ireland) Limited (Hanrahan).1    
  An assessment of the dissatisfaction coupled with a re-examination of past 
judicial pronouncements on the horizontal application of constitutional rights reveals 
two problems. First, scholars have implied that Irish courts have sought to abandon or 
suspend direct horizontality and simultaneously have asked litigants to establish a 
high threshold of qualification before they will intervene. An alternative reading of 
the status quo will be argued for. Secondly, there appears to be a conflation of direct 
and indirect horizontality. It will be contended that both court pronouncements and 
academic commentary have contributed to such conflation, and moreover, have made 
the distinction between them unnecessarily subtle. Ultimately, it will be shown that 
the judiciary in Ireland does acknowledge both direct and indirect horizontality as 
distinct strands and that this understanding conforms to international practice.   
Significantly, it appears that the doctrine of horizontality has not matured and 
retains the status of a neglected but gifted child with huge potential seeking to be 
released. The so-called lack of maturity has not been subjected to any comprehensive 
examination whether empirical, analytical or otherwise. Although the “lack of 
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maturity” may mean different things to different individuals this paper views the lack 
of maturity as referring to the apparent lack of a clear normative basis; the apparent 
lack of deep judicial elaboration; the relative lack of case law on the subject and the 
relatively mild scholarly interest in the subject.  Consequently, this article assumes 
that the re-examination of past judicial statements and the assessment of commentary 
by scholars provides a context (among many possible others) for future and more 
focused examination and understanding of the apparent lack of maturity. 
A further assumption is that the jurisprudence of horizontality in Ireland 
requires deep reflection on the approaches to horizontality potentially available and 
the circumstances of their invocation. A desired product of such reflection is the 
identification of a clear normative basis and the scope of horizontality. Accordingly, 
the re-examination of judicial pronouncements and the assessments of academic 
commentaries on the meaning of horizontality in the Irish legal system provide an 
entry point towards the identification of such a normative framework and the scope of 
horizontality. The article aims to suggest that the maturity of horizontality in Ireland 
is in part impeded by lack of clarity in academic commentary and judicial 
pronouncements on the options and scope open to litigants under the doctrine of 
horizontality.  
The article will begin by defining and distinguishing direct from indirect 
horizontality in line with conventional international understanding. Secondly, the 
article will discuss the constitutional duty of the state to discharge its constitutional 
obligations on the basis that the continuing relevance of horizontality is largely 
dependent on the recognition of the state’s obligation. Thereafter, the article will 
highlight views that suggest horizontality is in an unsatisfactory state. The article will 
then examine the Irish judiciary’s pronouncements and scholarly commentary on 
horizontality in the light of the identified problems. Ultimately, the article will 
tentatively suggest that the route towards the attainment of an analytical or normative 
framework for horizontality lies in opening up to developments in other jurisdictions. 
 
The Doctrine of Horizontality: Towards a Definition  
In this part an attempt will be made to define and to distinguish direct from 
indirect horizontality in line with conventional international understanding. 
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International practice informs that horizontality can be classified as direct or indirect.2 
Under direct horizontality an individual is able to plead before the courts that 
fundamental constitutional rights be applied directly to a private relationship.3 Peter 
Benson defines direct horizontality as a situation where constitutional rights 
. . . just as they are defined . . . are to be applied directly . . . to relations between 
private individuals. The definition and vindication of these rights are fully 
independent of the doctrines and operation of private law.4 
 
Johan van der Walt demonstrates the operation of direct horizontality by 
posing a question: 
What if a claimant was unable to find a cause of action in terms of the existing law of delict 
[read tort]? …The question would be this: can such a claimant then raise a fundamental right 
directly as a cause of action, or must he or she simply accept…that this is simply one of those 
purely social violations of fundamental rights that does not concern the law and therefore is 
not covered by the Bill of Rights?5  
 
Indirect horizontality occurs when a fundamental constitutional right attaches 
to a different right or obligation found in the common law.6 Similarly Peter Benson 
explains that indirect horizontality is the application of constitutional rights to 
transactions between private individuals “channeled through the doctrines, 
methodology and procedures of private law.”7 Johan van der Walt summarises the 
operation of indirect horizontality described in the South African case of Du Plessis v 
De Klerk8 as follows: 
Private disputes could only be taken to court on causes of action or grounds of defence already 
contained in private law. Once this had been done, the parties could expect the courts not to 
apply such principles or rules in a manner that would be inconsistent with the constitution. 
Indeed they could rely on the court to develop and transform existing law to ensure that it 
accorded with the principles and values embodied in the Bill of Rights.9 
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In both Meskell v C.I.E (Meskell) and Murtagh Properties Ltd v Cleary 
(Murtagh) constitutional rights were defined and applied directly to regulate what 
were private relationships.10 The rationale was that there were no statutory or 
common law remedies available to plaintiffs. In Meskell the Supreme Court identified 
from the right to join the trade union the right not to join a trade union and enforced 
this against the defendant company. In Murtagh the court identified and enforced the 
right to earn a livelihood without discrimination on the basis of sex. In the cases of 
Hanrahan and Philip Hosford v John Murphy and Sons Ltd (Philip Hosford)11 the 
plaintiffs unsuccessfully asked the courts “to develop” the common law so that it 
conformed to the requirements of the relevant constitutional rights. 
 Before the article proceeds to discuss the constitutional duty of the state to 
discharge its constitutional obligations it must be pointed out that the judiciary in 
Ireland have developed an approach to horizontality referred to as the constitutional 
tort. It is not clear whether the term “constitutional tort” is one of legal or judicial art 
and thereby carrying with it a specific meaning, scope and limitations. In this paper it 
will be assumed that it is equivalent to and incorporates both direct and indirect 
horizontality.  
 
Fundamental Constitutional Rights, the State and the Concept of the State’s Duty to 
Discharge Obligations 
In this section and on account of its relevance to the doctrine of horizontality a 
discussion of the doctrine of the constitutional duty of the state to discharge its 
obligations will be made. A point will be made that the acknowledgement of the 
existence of a judicial space for the implementation of constitutional rights under the 
doctrine of the state’s obligation to discharge constitutional rights is a sine qua non 
for the operation of the doctrine of horizontality. Under the constitutional law of 
Ireland the “state” has a duty to discharge its obligations which may arise under a 
particular constitutional right. The term “state” is understood here expansively to 
include the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the agents of the state.12 This 
duty it appears is implied from Article 34 of the Constitution. Hogan and Whyte 
remark that 
                                                 
10 [1973] IR 121and [1972] IR 330 
11 [1988] ILRM 300 (HC) 
12 Articles 40 to 44. Gerard Hogan and Gerard Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution, (3rd ed, 
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Thus, the High Court and, on appeal, the Supreme Court have exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine whether laws are valid or invalid on the ground that they are in conflict with any 
provision of the Constitution. The most significant provisions in this respect are those which 
recognise basic or fundamental rights…13   
 
The discharge of obligations by the state implies that, in cases, the state ought 
to protect, enforce and vindicate a constitutional right conferred or a constitutional 
duty owed to an individual. The concept of a duty imposed on the state to discharge 
its constitutional obligations has pedigree and in a line of cases Irish Courts have 
attempted to clarify the nature of this obligation.  
The constitutional duty was first explained in Byrne v Ireland (Byrne); where 
it was argued on behalf of the State that the plaintiff was not able to successfully 
prosecute an action for damages against the State in tort because the State was 
immune from such action on the basis of the doctrine of state sovereignty. In rejecting 
this proposition Walsh J made some observations at several points in his judgement 
on the nature of the State’s constitutional obligation which, it is argued, are relevant to 
horizontality.14 The views of Walsh J are effectively summarised in the following 
passage: 
There are several instances in the Constitution of Ireland also where the State undertakes 
obligations towards citizens. It is not the case that these are justiciable only when some law is 
being passed which directly infinges those rights or when some law is passed to implement 
them. They are justiciable when there has been a failure on the part of the state to discharge 
the obligations or to perform the duties laid upon the state by the constitution.15  
 
Read together the observations of Walsh J may be construed as reinforcing the 
view that failure to pass a statute or to develop the common law or to take necessary 
action that prevents infringement or a threat of infringement of an identified 
constitutional right will suggest breach of obligation on the part of the state and such 
failure potentially may, in appropriate cases, be met by either court censure or court 
redress. In order to make sense of the views expressed by Walsh J in relation to the 
                                                 
13 Gerard Hogan and Gerard Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution, (4th ed, Butterworths, 2003), para. 
15.59. 
14 [1972] IR 241 (SC), 264, 281. 
15 Ibid, 280 [Emphasis added]. 
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doctrine of horizontality it is necessary to elaborate further the nature of the obligation 
that the judiciary has as a constituent arm of the state.16  
Before this is done it is also necessary to address an argument that Byrne has 
been overtaken by jurisprudence on the separation of powers which severely restricts 
the power of an organ of state from encroaching on an area of competence of another 
organ of state. In Boland v An Taoiseach Fitzgerald CJ stated affirmed the capacity of 
courts to review executive action where there was “a clear disregard by the 
Government of the powers and duties conferred upon it by the Constitution.”17 
A contemporary touchstone for the doctrine of separation of powers is 
provided by the Supreme Court cases of Sinnott v Minister for Education18 (Sinnott) 
and T.D. v Minister for Education19 (T.D.). Oran Doyle notes that in both cases the 
question “whether the courts had the power to grant a mandatory order to enforce 
constitutional rights” was answered in the negative.20 In summarising the majority 
opinion in T.D. Doyle states that: 
Each organ of government exercises its own type of powers and only interacts with other 
organs of government where it has explicit authorisation from the Constitution to do so. The 
courts have a power to review how the other organs of government exercise their powers; the 
courts have no power to exercise those other powers themselves. It follows from this that a 
mandatory order which determines policy for the executive branch is illegitimate.21  
  
On this account, it is submitted that the cases of Sinnott and T.D. are not 
directly relevant to the doctrine of horizontality. These cases do not give clarification 
whether and in what way the doctrine of separation of powers impacts on the doctrine 
of horizontality. The specific separation of powers issue dealt with in Sinnott and T.D. 
focused on the power of courts to compel the executive to take action whereas the 
doctrine of horizontality focuses in the ability of the court to regulate private actions 
through the direct application of a constitutional right or through the modification of 
private law. In assessing whether courts under the guise of the doctrine of 
horizontality are encroaching on the legislature’s area of competence in a given 
                                                 
16 It is also important to recall the description of direct and indirect horizontality and also view or 
assume that the judiciary is included in the notion of the “state”.  
17 [1974] IR 338, 362.   
18 [2001] 2 IR 545 
19 [2000] 4 IR 259 
20 Oran Doyle, Constitutional Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (Clarus Press, 2008), 363, paragraph 
13-19. 
21 Ibid, 367, paragraph 13-31 [Emphasis added] 
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context it is necessary to determine which organ of state has the duty to ensure that 
deficiencies in the common law or statute law which regulate private life are rectified. 
Furthermore, the conception of horizontality advanced in this article is consistent with 
the established constitutional position that courts “have a negative power to declare a 
(statute) law invalid but do not have the power to declare what might be enacted to 
replace the invalid (statute) law”.22 Furthermore, Hogan and Whyte have stated that 
“by contrast with constitutional cases involving legislation Byrne involved the 
creation of constitutional judge-made principles regulating this area in a positive 
manner”.23 
Consequently, in the light of the separation of powers argument, the 
observations made by Walsh J in Byrne ought to be placed in an idealistic position of 
the perfect political community. This is essentially a position that some classical and 
modern liberal theories of law and state would also take and it carries along with it a 
set of basic assumptions.24 In a perfect situation (as distinct from a lawless chaotic 
state of nature) a political community, through a law making body, would have 
presciently developed appropriate legal regimes to respond to any potential 
constitutional rights infringing scenario. Such regimes are instantiated in legislation 
and the common law. Reality bourne out of experience informs us that political 
communities are ineluctably fallible and incapable of producing a corpus of perfect 
anticipatory laws. In the event of legislative or common law failure courts are 
therefore entitled in appropriate circumstances to address lacunae in the imperfect 
body of law.25 Courts are saddled with the obligation to ensure that an identified 
constitutional right infringing scenario is addressed and this scenario may exist in 
relationships either between the state and the individual or between individuals.  
Byrne is a case which involved the constitutionality of a common law rule (or 
to be precise a public common law rule) rather than legislation. Byrne is also a case 
where a constitutional right guaranteed by the state was in fact infringed by the state; 
the state failed to facilitate a citizen’s right to sue the state in its private capacity. 
                                                 
22 Gerard Hogan and Gerard Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution, (4th ed, Butterworths, 2003) para. 
15.76. [Emphasis added]. 
23 Ibid, paragraph 15.80 
24 See J.G. Riddall, Jurisprudence, (OUP, 1999) chapter 18 on Liberalism. The analytical positivism of 
Hans Kelsen & H.L.A. Hart; Lon Fuller’s procedural natural law and the theory of interpretation of 
Ronald Dworkin have a common feature in that they make the assumption that judges have discretion 
that allows them to address hard cases although they differ on the judge’s source of authority to do so.  
25 See Denise Meyerson, Understanding Jurisprudence, (Routeledge–Cavendish, 2007), especially 63-
67, where she explains H.L.A. Hart’s view of indeterminacy of law. 
 7
Since this article focuses on private relationships a question may be raised whether 
the duty of the state (specifically the judiciary) to discharge its obligations equally 
applies in a dispute between private individuals. An argument that captures the 
obligation of the court envisaged here (reflected by Walsh J in Byrne) in the context 
of a private relationship was advanced in Philip Hosford. Costello J observed 
Whilst at common law a claim for an award of damages for the harm it is alleged the plaintiffs 
sustained does not lie, this is not the case if the harm resulted from an infringement of 
constitutionally protected rights. If the defendants' careless act amounted to a constitutional 
wrong which inflicted harm on the plaintiffs then I think damages are in principle recoverable; 
otherwise, the protective provisions of the Constitution would be vacuous and valueless. If 
therefore the plaintiffs can establish that the defendants were guilty of a breach of a 
constitutionally imposed duty which inflicted harm on the plaintiffs then damages are 
recoverable even though at common law an award in respect of such harm could not be 
made.26  
 
 The plaintiffs in Philip Hosford unsuccessfully sought to recover damages in 
negligence on the basis of an argument that the negligent acts of the defendant (a 
private entity) had caused the death of their father and as a consequence they had been 
permanently deprived of a moral, intellectual, religious and educational nature in 
breach of Articles 41. The plaintiffs also made the alternative argument that the court 
as an arm of the state had a constitutional obligation to develop a common law rule in 
the tort law of negligence on the basis of a constitutional value. Costello J rejected the 
plaintiff’s Article 41 argument in the following terms  
It follows that the rights which are conferred by Article 41(1)(2) are (a) the right to protection 
from legislation which attacks or impairs the constitution or the authority of the Family and 
(b) the right to protection from the deliberate act of State officials which attack (sic) or impair 
(sic) the constitution or authority of the Family. It would also follow that a private person 
whose negligent act had so seriously injured the head of a Family that the constitution of the 
family unit was fatally impaired had not thereby infringed any constitutional right enjoyed by 
members of the affected Family under either paragraph of Article 41(1).27 
  
The constitutional obligation of the court in a private relationship context was 
also invoked in the case of Hanrahan. The plaintiffs alleged an infringement of a 
constitutional right by, ostensibly, a private common law rule. Similarly, the 
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discussion by the Supreme Court potentially has importance for the debate about a 
court’s ability to intervene in private relationships on the basis of an apparent 
constitutional state obligation. Nonetheless, some observations which Henchy J made 
in the case have raised uncertainties which potentially may weaken the argument for a 
robust jurisprudence on horizontality. In Hanrahan Henchy J explained that “the 
implementation of those constitutional rights is primarily a matter for the State”.28 
McMahon and Binchy suggest Henchy J was signalling that the judiciary does 
recognise that the legislature essentially has a prior claim to the issue of the 
implementation of constitutional rights.29 They observe in Henchy J “a striking 
reluctance to involve the courts in the role of refashioning tort law, ‘root and branch’, 
in the light of the Constitution”.30  
Taken together the observations by McMahon and Binchy are open to two 
possible and different interpretations. On the one hand, that the signal given and the 
unwillingness shown by Henchy J to “re-organise” tort law “root and branch” was due 
to deference to the legislature’s prior claim. On the other hand, – although the courts 
are entitled to defer to the legislature in some cases and in the light of the remarks 
made by Henchy J in the particular instance of Hanrahan – it was the specific 
combination of facts and legal issues that arose in the case persuaded Henchy J to 
refrain from “re-organising” tort law in order to vindicate the plaintiff’s claim.  
In Hanrahan the plaintiffs’ relied on the tort of nuisance and argued that the 
factory owned by the defendant had emitted noxious substances, which among other 
things caused the plaintiffs’ ill health. The plaintiffs’ contended that to vindicate their 
Article 40.3 Constitutional rights the court had to shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant. Although sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ difficulties in producing the 
necessary evidence, Henchy J rejected the plaintiffs’ contention primarily on two 
grounds. First, the plaintiffs’ had the option to pursue the action in negligence and 
ultimately could have availed of the res ipsa loquitur rule. Secondly, the reversal of 
                                                 
28 Note 1, 636. Gerard Hogan and Gerard Whyte, note 13, para. 7.3.239 observe that in Hanrahan the 
existence of the ‘tort of nuisance’ could be interpreted to mean the implementation of the state’s 
discharge of its duty. This suggests that the judiciary for the purpose of the constitutional principle 
considered in this instance is the “state” since one can hardly claim the common law is a product of the 
legislature.  
29 B. McMahon and W. Binchy, note 1. (This is a speculative view as Henchy J did not expressly adopt 
this position in his judgment.) 
30 Ibid, para 1.19. 
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the burden of proof at the trial stage would have prejudiced the defendant in the light 
of the “interrogatories”, “notices for particulars” and the “discovery of documents”.31 
If the latter interpretation by McMahon and Binchy is the correct 
understanding of what they wish to communicate then, it is submitted, their 
interpretation is on its face fair. The plaintiffs had not exhausted the options open to 
them in order to vindicate their Article 40.3 Constitutional rights.32 Indeed there is 
nothing wrong with a view that expects courts to exercise restraint when they deem it 
appropriate on the basis of either legal principle, normative requirements or the 
exigencies of public policy in a situation that potentially calls for interference with 
private law. However, a significant point is that the survival of the doctrine of 
horizontality depends on adopting a perspective on the doctrine of the state’s 
obligation which acknowledges the existence of a judicial space for the 
implementation of constitutional rights. 
The use of the phrase “root and branch” perhaps may not be appropriate as a 
descriptive tool of what the Supreme Court was asked to do in Hanrahan since it 
suggests wholesale change. An analogy can be drawn here between what the court 
was asked to do in Hanrahan on the basis of horizontality with the inherent 
jurisdiction that courts have to develop or contract the common law when faced with a 
novel situation, a judicial activity known as the incremental development of the 
common law. The South African constitutional court judge O’Regan J in Kern v 
Minister of Safety and Security33 (Kern CC) explained the meaning of the incremental 
development of the common law through the principle of precedent in the following 
terms 
From time to time, a common-law rule is changed altogether, or a new rule is introduced, and 
this clearly constitutes the development of the common law. More commonly, however, courts 
decide cases within the framework of an existing rule … firstly a court may merely have to 
apply the rule to a set of facts which it is clear fall within the terms of the rule or existing 
authority. The rule is then not developed but merely applied to facts bound by the rule. 
Secondly … a court may have to determine whether a new set of facts falls within or beyond 
the scope of an existing rule. The precise ambit of each rule is therefore clarified in relation to 
each new set of facts. A court faced with a new set of facts, not on all fours with any set of 
                                                 
31 Note 1, page? 
32 Under s. 8 (2) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act no 108 of 1996 indirect 
horizontality can be invoked only where legislation does not give effect to the relevant constitutional 
right.   
33 Case CCT 52/04 (CC 13 June, 2005) < http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/hyperion-
image/J-CCT52-04> 
 10
facts previously adjudicated, must decide whether a common-law rule applies to this new 
factual situation or not. If it holds that the new set of facts falls within the rule, the ambit of 
the rule is extended. If it holds that it does not, the ambit of the rule is restricted, not 
extended.34 
 
As opposed to requesting the Supreme Court to carry out wholesale change the 
plaintiffs in Hanrahan were seeking the alteration of a tort law “rule” on authority of 
the doctrine of horizontality. Nonetheless, there is the risk that the statement by 
Henchy J will be construed in accordance with the former interpretation as pointed 
out by Binchy;35 that courts have no business dealing with such situations (failure by 
the legislature to protect or enforce constitutional rights through the modification 
private law rules) when they do arise. The rationale is that the implementation of 
constitutional rights, from a competence point of view, is “exclusively” an area for the 
legislature and the judgment of Barrington J in McDonnell v Ireland36 is often cited 
for reinforcement.37 This interpretation and its rationalisation is a variation on the 
separation of powers argument and ought to be challenged because it misrepresents 
the views of Barrington J38 and also has the potential to undermine (and is 
inconsistent with) the established premise upon which horizontality is built.  
The legislature may correctly be assumed to have the primary responsibility 
for implementing constitutional rights through legislation. The role of courts therefore 
is, in relation to legislation, limited to ensuring that such legislation does not breach 
constitutional provisions. The courts may equally be correctly assumed to have the 
responsibility of elaborating constitutional rights through the development of the 
common law. Courts can therefore be expected to cast a watchful eye on the common 
law to ensure that it comports with constitutional provisions. From a perspective of 
judicial practice orthodoxy it would be strange to expect courts not to undertake such 
                                                 
34 Ibid para 16. 
35 William Binchy, 201, 205. 
36 [1998] 1 IR 134, 147 (SC). According to Barrington J “the general problem of resolving how 
constitutional rights are to be balanced against each other and reconciled with the exigencies of the 
common good is, in the first instance, a matter for the legislature”. 
37 Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law and Direct Horizontal Effect & Colm O’Cinneide, 
Taking Horizontal Effect Seriously & McMahon & Binchy, note 1.  
38 Note 36, 148 Barrington J further stated ‘If the general law provides an adequate cause of action to 
vindicate a constitutional right it appears to me that the injured party cannot ask the Court to devise a 
new and different cause of action”. This implies judicial willingness to intervene where inadequacy is 
established. [Emphasis added] 
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a function on the basis of an argument that it is an area of activity preserved for the 
legislature.    
It is submitted that Henchy J commences his analysis from the idealistic 
position of a perfect political community and that taken literally his statement (on 
legislative exclusivity) is inconsistent with established judicial practice regarding the 
role of courts in the modification of private law in the light of constitutional values. It 
may be argued that the obligation imposed on the courts here is similar to the so 
called incremental development of the common law since the latter also operates on 
the basis of assumptions of imperfect law and the inherent common law changing 
jurisdiction (or obligation) that courts retain. Indeed it would be odd, to say the least, 
if the development of the common law was strictly viewed as a function of the 
legislature. The statement by Henchy J must be viewed as steeped in the 
understanding that modern political communities have of a constitutional state where 
the division of state responsibilities is fairly well articulated and also where judicial 
authorities will react accordingly in the event of legislative or common law 
dysfunction in the light of constitutional requirements. If viewed from this perspective 
the statement of Henchy J does not put a blanket injunction against the re-organisation 
of or the interference with private law. It is a statement that is functional in orientation 
and highlights a nuanced view of this institutional relationship.39 The statement ought 
to be viewed as a nuanced perspective on the constitutional duty to discharge its 
obligations in the light of the relationship between private law and constitutional 
rights and indeed on what is the proper relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary in that respect.40  
At this juncture it is necessary to point out three features common to, and 
implicit in the extracts from the Irish judgments highlighted above. First, and in 
appropriate cases, there is a distinctly clear constitutional duty on the state to ensure, 
and an individual has a corresponding right to seek, the protection and enforcement of 
a constitutional right. In the event of state failure through non-implementation of law, 
                                                 
39 See David Gwynn Morgan, A Judgement Too Far? Judicial Activism and The Constitution, (Cork 
University Press, 2001),15-18 where he discusses the law making aspects of judicial functions.  
40 The doctrine of separation of powers conventionally explains this conceptual arrangement of division 
of responsibility. Other commentators retain a flexible view of separation of powers. See Mark De 
Blacam, Children, Constitutional Rights and the Separation of Powers, (2002) 37 Irish Jurist, 113; 
David Gwynn Morgan, ibid and Gerry Whyte, Discerning the Philosophical premises of the 
Constitution Review Group: An Analysis of the Recommendations on Fundamental Rights, 1 
Contemporary Issues in Irish Law, 216, 225-228. 
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implementation of infringing or inadequate law, the state may be obliged to ensure, 
and the individual may be entitled to expect the vindication of a constitutional right. 
Secondly, the satisfaction of obligations and the exercise of individual rights will not 
only be invoked in relation to the vertical relationship an individual has with the state 
but will also arise out of the horizontal relationship private individuals have with each 
other. Thirdly, the term “state” under the constitution includes the judiciary and that 
as a general principle it is also expected to vindicate constitutional rights. 
 
The Doctrine of Horizontality: A Gifted but Neglected Child? 
Irish courts retain the proud distinction of being an early progenitor in the 
application of fundamental rights to private relationships. In Ireland the doctrine of 
horizontality appears to have been first articulated in the cases of Burke and O’Reilly 
v Burke and Quail and Re Blake41. In both cases, and on the basis that private action 
breached Article 42 of the Constitution, “directions in wills regarding children’s 
education and religious upbringing” respectively were declared void.42 A further early 
example of horizontal application of constitutional rights is Educational Co. of 
Ireland v Fitzpatrick (N0.1) (Educational Co. of Ireland N0.1).43 The High Court 
granted an interlocutory injunction in favour of the plaintiff company restraining 
members of the Irish Union of Distributive Workers and Clerks from picketing at the 
plaintiff’s premises with the intent of compelling employees of the plaintiff to join the 
Union. On appeal O’ Dalaigh J held  
I incline to view that if the employers had attempted to compel their non-union employees to 
join the union…they would have acted contrary to the Constitution, the state guarantees 
liberty to exercise…Liberty to exercise a right, it seems to me, prima facie, implies a 
correlative duty on others to abstain from interfering with the exercise of such right.44  
 
On the subsequent full hearing in Educational Co. of Ireland v Fitzpatrick 
(N0.2) (Educational Co. of Ireland N0.2) Budd J stated emphatically 
If an established right in law exists a citizen has the right to assert it and it is the duty of the 
courts to aid and assist him in the assertion of his right. The court will therefore assist and 
uphold a citizen’s constitutional rights. Obedience to the law is required of every citizen, and 
it follows that if one citizen has a right under the constitution there exists a correlative duty on 
                                                 
41 [1951] IR 216 and [1955] IR 69 
42 Michael Forde, Constitutional Law of Ireland, Chapter 28, (2nd edition, First Law, 2004), 835 
43 [1961] IR 323, (HC) 
44 Ibid, 343 (SC) 
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the part of other citizens to respect that right and not to interfere with it. To say otherwise 
would be tantamount to saying that a citizen can set the Constitution at nought and that a right 
solemnly given by our fundamental law is valueless. It follows that the Courts will not so act 
as to permit any body of citizens to deprive another of his constitutional rights.45 
  
A decade later the Supreme Court applied fundamental rights to private 
relations in Meskell and Walsh J held  
A right guaranteed by the Constitution or granted by the Constitution can be protected by 
action or enforced by action even though such action may not fit into any of the ordinary 
forms of action in either common law or equity and … the constitutional right carried within it 
its own right to a remedy or for the enforcement of it. Therefore, if a person has suffered 
damage by virtue of a breach of a constitutional right, that person is entitled to seek redress 
against the person or persons who have infringed that right.46  
 
The horizontal use of fundamental constitutional rights is now an established 
feature on Ireland’s legal landscape and, in a profound sense, it is irreversible. 
McMahon and Binchy assert that the judicial era between Educational Co. of Ireland 
N0. 1 and the late 1980’s represents an age when the courts were optimistic and 
confident about the efficacy of the doctrine of horizontality.47 A picture is thus drawn 
of courts that were generally inclined to deal favourably with a litigant who invoked 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution in a private dispute. Since the late 1980s 
Supreme and High court judgments have attempted to further elaborate the doctrine of 
horizontality. However, McMahon and Binchy go on to observe that the gains 
attained following Educational Co. of Ireland N0. 1 and Meskell have been reversed. 
An important judgment that is cited in this regard is the Supreme Court judgment of 
Henchy J in Hanrahan.  
The views expressed by McMahon and Binchy suggest that although the 
doctrine of horizontality is an established phenomenon in Ireland’s constitutional law 
contemporary attempts to invoke it successfully will be rare. Other academics have in 
the past drawn a picture of a doctrine in its infancy, of missed opportunities and of a 
hardening judicial attitude towards it. Hogan and Whyte observed that “judicial 
analysis of the use of the law of tort to protect constitutional rights is as yet at a 
                                                 
45 [1961] IR 345, 368 (HC). On appeal the Supreme Court confirmed the views of the High Court.  
46 Ibid, 132-3 
47 McMahon and Binchy, note 1, para 1.60. 
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somewhat primitive stage”. 48 Siobhan Mullally noted the apparent undeveloped 
nature of the horizontal equality clause jurisprudence (Article 40.1).49 Similarly, for 
Colm O’Cinneide, the case of Murtagh represents a missed opportunity in that a tort 
of interference with livelihood could have been developed.50 
To date progress on horizontality from academic, judicial and policy 
perspectives is mixed. Scholarly work on Irish approaches to horizontality in Irish law 
journals is dated and this perhaps is an indication of the level of interest scholars have 
on the subject.51 Furthermore, with the exception of Forde’s text on constitutional 
law, horizontality has relatively not been accorded significant space in Constitutional 
law texts.52 An extended treatment of this important constitutional subject is found in 
a textbook on Tort law, by McMahon and Binchy.53 O’Cinneide observes that, as 
McMahon and Binchy do, in the 1990s Irish courts were cautious in applying 
constitutional rights in private law whereas Margulies sees Irish courts as generally 
lacking caution in their use of the doctrine of horizontality.54 Institutional human 
rights policy and practice appear to be insulated from practice on horizontality. Due to 
a deliberate policy decision the legal regime that incorporates into Irish law the 
European Convention on Human Rights in Ireland, The ECHR Act 2003, ostensibly 
does not address the horizontality question. Donncha O’Connell suggests “there is 
clearly a desire to inhibit the development of a horizontal application of the 
Convention”.55 Similarly, due to the limitations imposed by the ECHR Act 2003, the 
strategy document of the Irish Commission on Human Rights does not seem to have a 
                                                 
48 Hogan and Whyte, note 12, 708  
49 Siobhan Mullally, Equality Guarantees in Irish Constitutional Law - The Myth of Constitutionalism 
and the Neutral State, in Tim Murphy and Patrick Twomey (eds) Ireland’s Evolving Constitution, 
1937-97: Collected Essays, (Hart, 1998),147. These comments were made in the light of Carna Foods 
Limited v Eagle Star Insurance Co. (Ireland) Limited [1995] 1 IR 526 (HC); [1997] 2 ILRM 499 (SC) 
50 Colm O’Cinneide, Taking Horizontal Effect Seriously, note 1, p. 90  
51 Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law, note 1. To the knowledge of the author, since Martin B. 
Margulies (2002) Standards of Review and State Action Under the Irish Constitution, (2002), 37 Irish 
Jurist (N.S.) 23 and Colm O’Cinneide, Taking Horizontal Effect Seriously note 1, work on 
horizontality has not appeared in Irish journals.  
52 Michael Forde note 42 
53 B. McMahon and W. Binchy, Law of Tort, note 1. 
54 Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law, note 1 at p. 236 and Martin B. Margulies note 51, 50-54. 
Margulies has expressed reservations on the use of constitutional rights horizontality.  
55 Donncha O’Connell, The ECHR Act 2003: A Critical Perspective, in Ursula Kilkelly, ECHR and 
Irish Law, (ed), (Jordan, 2004). A comparison of the Irish Act with the English Human Rights Act 
1998 and especially sections 3(1), 6(1), 6(3) (a) and (b) prima facie shows reluctance on the part of the 
Irish state to commit itself to horizontality. 
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set agenda on the role of human rights in private law.56  Given these observations it 
would seem that O’Cinneide is on firm ground in expressing doubt whether Ireland 
ought to continue to be viewed comparatively as a leader in this area of the law.57 
In reflecting upon horizontality and how it is faring in Ireland across the board 
this article is inclined to hold the view that the judiciary’s comments have been even 
or at least not hostile. This evenness or lack of hostility is cause for optimism since 
the discussion on horizontality was in the first place made a reality, and was driven, 
by judicial activism.58 Similarly, the tone of academic commentary on the judiciary’s 
use of horizontality has generally been balanced.59 Indeed, on balance, academics 
appear to share the view that the use of rights in private law is a progressive idea and 
a good tool to have in order to check the excesses of private conduct. Although it is 
now over 50 years since horizontality made its first appearance on Ireland’s legal 
landscape there is, curiously, also agreement that the doctrine of horizontality has not 
matured but retains the status of a neglected but gifted child with huge potential that is 
seeking to be released. In the next section the Irish judiciary’s pronouncements on 
horizontality will be examined. 
 
Addressing Inconsistency in Judicial and Academic Discourse on Approaches to 
Horizontality in Ireland  
In this section a discussion of the approaches to the doctrine of horizontality 
that Irish Courts apply to private relationships will be made and it will be suggested 
that scholarly commentary and the actual conduct of courts as regards the options 
open to the courts so far is problematic on two bases. Scholarly work on the doctrine 
suggests that the Irish courts, having failed to come up with a coherent framework for 
the use of direct horizontality, have sought to abandon or suspend this approach and 
simultaneously or alternatively asked litigants to establish a high threshold of 
qualification before they will intervene. This thesis is advanced on the basis of an 
                                                 
56Human Rights Commission's Strategic Plan 2007 to 2011 <available at 
http://www.ihrc.ie/_fileupload/downloads/IHRC_ENGLISH.pdf > (last accessed 25 May 2009) 
57 Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law, note 1, 251 
58 In South Africa and Malawi for example the Constitution has provisions that expressly empower 
courts to apply human rights horizontally. See Sibo Banda, Constitutional Mimicry and Common Law 
Reform in a Rights-Based Post-Colonial Setting: The Case of South Africa and Malawi, 2009, 53(1) 
Journal of African Law, 142-170; See also David Gwynn Morgan, note 39. 
59 McMahon and Binchy, note 1; Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law and Colm O’Cinneide, 
Taking Horizontal Effect Seriously, note 1. Martin B. Margulies (2002) note 51 Michael Forde note 42, 
James Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, (3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 200); Hogan and Whyte, 
note 12 and Hogan and Whyte, note 13. 
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interpretation of Henchy J in Hanrahan where he stated that courts will intervene on 
the basis of horizontality only where there has been “failure to implement” 
constitutional rights or where the execution of constitutional rights through the 
common law was “plainly inadequate”. The article will urge an alternative reading of 
Henchy J. A related and established point is that Irish courts are questioned for 
invariably meting out judgments on the basis of direct horizontality.60 It ought to be 
pointed out that choice of approach here may be dictated by factors beyond the 
control of the court. Nonetheless, a point is well made that the invariable use of direct 
horizontality may effectively drown out other more suitable (in cases) approaches.   
Secondly, it will be contented that both courts and scholars have contributed to 
conflating direct and indirect horizontality and to making the distinction between 
them unnecessarily subtle. It is clear that in spite of throwing up suggestive hints on 
the distinction between direct and indirect horizontality Irish courts have not put the 
latter into practice nor have they elaborated on the standard which they identified as 
necessary for bringing indirect horizontality into operation in a concrete situation. 
Similarly, scholars of horizontality have been complicit in the conflation. The 
argument that courts require a high threshold is justified on the ground that Henchy J 
used the phrases “plainly inadequate” and “basically inadequate” which he identified 
as a condition precedent before courts will intervene.61  An attempt will be made to 
show how this conflation has come about. In the process direct will be distinguished 
clearly from indirect horizontality as conceptualised by Irish courts and it will also be 
asserted that such a conceptualisation is compatible with conventional understanding. 
It will essentially be argued that the judicial love affair with direct horizontality has 
not fizzled out whereas, in spite of an explicit indication of intent, the love affair with 
indirect horizontality has never been given the opportunity to blossom even though 
the judiciary has given encouraging signs as exemplified by the judgment of Henchy J 
in Hanrahan. 
The article will proceed to discuss judicial pronouncements in order to identify 
assertions of direct horizontality and thereafter will examine such pronouncements 
                                                 
60 Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law and Colm O’Cinneide, Taking Horizontal Effect 
Seriously, note 1; 
61 Ibid, note 1; McMahon & Binchy, note 1, para 1.19 envisage a situation where a court will interpret 
private law as not “basically ineffective” thus preventing them from intervening and yet perceive the 
same private law “as less than fully effective”.; and whereas William Binchy, note 1, 201, 208 suggests 
in “relation to basic ineffectiveness” that the role Henchy J clearly envisaged for courts “was that of 
filling gaps in private law”. 
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with the aim of discovering judicial postulations of indirect horizontality in the light 
of conventional international understanding of indirect horizontality. Before 
proceeding to discuss these matters the oft cited extract from the judgment of Henchy 
J in Hanrahan which attempts to succinctly summarize the law on horizontality in 
Ireland will be reproduced 
So far as I am aware, the constitutional provisions relied on have never been used in the courts 
to shape the form of any existing tort or to change the normal onus of proof. The 
implementation of those constitutional rights is primarily a matter for the State and the courts 
are entitled to intervene only when there has been a failure to implement or, where the 
implementation relied on is plainly inadequate, to effectuate the constitutional guarantee in 
question. In many torts – for example, negligence, defamation, trespass to person or property 
– a plaintiff may give evidence of what he claims to be a breach of a constitutional right, but 
he may fail in the action because of what is usually a matter of onus of proof or because of 
some other legal or technical defence. A person may of course in the absence of a common 
law or statutory cause of action, sue directly for breach of a constitutional right (see Meskell v 
C.I.E.  IR 121); but when he founds his action on an existing tort he is normally confined to 
the limitations of that tort. It might be different if it could be shown that the tort in question is 
basically ineffective to protect his constitutional right. But that is not alleged here.62 
 
Direct Horizontality: Bringing Clarity to an Irish Perspective 
Speculative scholarly interpretations of the passage by Henchy J have generally 
portrayed it as symbolic of the judiciary’s disenchantment with horizontality or 
aspects of it.63 An implication of this interpretation is that judicial practice has rowed 
back from the gains that apparently were attained before the late 1980s. The courts are 
thus described as having failed to come up with a coherent framework for 
horizontality which is understood as the replacement of existing regimes of statutory 
and common law which regulate relevant areas of private law. As a consequence of 
this failure courts are described as seeking to abandon or suspend horizontality and to 
simultaneously require litigants to satisfy a high threshold of qualification before they 
will intervene on the basis of horizontality. This has been referred to as an “extra-
ordinary volte face” on the part of the courts.64 A necessary implication of this 
speculative interpretation is that the high threshold of qualification is either 
(a) required in respect of direct horizontality and that;  
(b) it is linked to the desire of courts to abandon direct horizontality; or 
                                                 
62 Note 1, 636 [emphasis added]. 
63 McMahon & Binchy, note 1, para 1.81. 
64 Ibid and Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law, note 1. 
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(c) required for both direct horizontality and indirect horizontality 
    
It will be argued that the observation of the alleged failure relates to direct 
horizontality and that it is not necessary for courts to come up with a coherent 
framework for direct horizontality in the sense suggested. Subsequently, it will be 
shown that the courts have not asked litigants to attain a high threshold of 
qualification before they will intervene and that in fact the courts have taken an 
essentially pragmatic approach to adjudication.    
McMahon and Binchy interpret the judgment by Henchy J as a signal that the 
Supreme Court found unpalatable the task of developing a comprehensive doctrine of 
direct horizontality. In their view 
The courts, having established that the infringement of constitutional rights by the state or by 
private individuals, warrants a remedy in the form of damages or an injunction, have baulked 
at the prospect of replacing pre-existing statutory and common law remedies by a new 
constitutional remedial regime but they have not repudiated the principle.65 [emphasis added]  
 
The implication here is that courts would have been required to embark on the 
unenviable task of developing a different and new body of law parallel to statutory 
law and the common law.66 This construction raises several points. First, Irish courts 
have not expressed a view prior to or post Hanrahan that they intended to replace 
“pre-existing statutory and common law remedies by a new constitutional remedial 
regime” as contended. The suggestion of “replacing pre-existing statutory” regimes 
requires to be examined carefully. If it is accepted that that the approach to direct 
horizontality demonstrated by Irish courts corresponds to international approaches to 
horizontality then the question of the possible “replacing of pre-existing statutory and 
common law” regimes does not arise at all. A premise of horizontality is the absence 
of legislation or the presence of inadequate common law. Inherent in horizontality is a 
fundamental respect for the primacy of legislation; assuming it does not itself infringe 
a constitutional right.67  Thus where legislation exists to regulate private relations 
courts have no authority to override it on the basis of direct horizontality. Secondly, 
direct horizontality as conventionally understood internationally does not require the 
                                                 
65 McMahon & Binchy, note 1, para 1.60. 
66 William Binchy, note 1, at 201. A point is made that the task was difficult because the courts had to 
deal with conceptual, normative and jurisdictional questions.   
67 The question of the presence of inadequate common law is dealt with below in the discussion on 
indirect horizontality. 
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replacement of common law remedies. As Johan van der Walt explains direct 
horizontality operates only where “a claimant was unable to find a cause of action in 
terms of the existing law”.68 Thirdly, the construction overlooks the fact that in the 
period prior to Hanrahan Irish courts were called upon to use and did use 
horizontality only in situations that fit the description of direct horizontality as given 
by Benson, Young and van der Walt.69 These points have an important implication 
and collectively raise doubt about the accuracy of the suggestion that courts intended 
to replace statute or common law.  
As pointed out McMahon and Binchy and O’Cinneide assert that courts, on 
account of Henchy J, have sought to abandon or suspend direct horizontality and 
deliberately and simultaneously have chosen to toughen the bases for intervention. It 
is proposed that the statement of Henchy J be read differently. In order to appreciate 
this assertion the key phrases in the statement by Henchy J in Hanrahan must be 
looked at again. Henchy J stated that courts will intervene only “where there is 
‘failure to implement” constitutional requirements” or “where implementation is 
‘plainly inadequate’ to effectuate the constitutional guarantee”. It is necessary to 
deconstruct these expressions and to precisely work out the circumstances they can be 
invoked and subsequently to relate these circumstances to the argument contended by 
McMahon and Binchy and O’Cinneide. These two phrases represent the distinction 
between direct and indirect horizontality in its most basic form. “Failure to 
implement” constitutional edicts is the basis for intervention through direct 
horizontality whereas the execution of rights that is “plainly inadequate” is the basis 
for intervention on the basis of indirect horizontality. Therefore, as opposed to 
abandoning direct horizontality the courts have in fact reinforced it. Furthermore, it 
will be contended that the suggested high qualification is in fact indirect horizontality, 
separate and distinct from direct horizontality.  
In order to understand the context of the phrase “failure to implement” we 
need to consider at least three things. First, the phrase “failure to implement” the 
Constitution in Henchy’s J statement must be read as qualified and explained by a 
subsequent sentence in the statement 
                                                 
68 Johan van der Walt, note 5, 352. 
69 Peter Benson, note 4, Johan van der Walt ibid and Alison L. Young, note 3.  
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a person may of course in the absence of a common law or statutory cause of action, sue 
directly for breach of a constitutional right (see Meskell v C.I.E.  IR 121)70  
 
Secondly, it is necessary to recall the discussion above on the duty the state 
has to discharge its constitutional obligations imposed by constitutional rights. An 
argument was advanced there that the acknowledgement of the existence of a judicial 
space for the implementation of constitutional rights under the doctrine of the state’s 
obligation to discharge constitutional rights is a sine qua non for the operation of the 
doctrine of horizontality. Thirdly, one can further appreciate the phrase by putting it 
in the context of Costello’s J statement in W. v Ireland (N0.2) where he distinguished 
constitutional rights as falling into two categories.71 In his view constitutional rights 
may be placed in two categories 
(a) those which, independently of the Constitution, are regulated and protected by law 
(common law and/or statutory law) and (b) those that are not so regulated and protected.72  
 
For those rights in the former category they operate through legislation and the 
common law which provide the framework through which Constitutional rights are 
protected. He said 
In this country there exists a large and complex body of laws which regulate the exercise and 
enjoyment of these basic rights, protects them against attack and provides compensation for 
their wrongful infringement … examples include ... The right to private property [and] the 
right to bodily integrity …73  
 
In contradistinction, rights in the latter category have not yet been 
operationalised, and although the Constitution “guarantees their exercise and 
enjoyment”, there is no statute or common law available to regulate their use or 
“prohibit an anticipated infringement or to compensate for a past one”.74 Presumably 
the state through the legislature would bear the burden of ensuring that a mechanism 
is put in place to regulate their use or “prohibition of their infringement and the 
provision of redress in the event of infringement.” So the rationale, among others, for 
this categorisation is that it enabled Costello J to assess, from the perspective of 
                                                 
70 Note 1, 636 
71 [1997] 2 IR 141 
72 Ibid, 164  
73 Ibid, 164  
74 Ibid, 165 
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fundamental rights, whether such legislative mechanisms were in place to 
operationalise constitutional rights or whether there was a failure to implement 
constitutional rights in the positive law of tort which in turn impacted adversely on the 
particular circumstances of the plaintiff. In the event of absence of legislation or the 
common law, a judge would be entitled to create a new rule, principle or method in 
order to fill a gap in the law where necessary. Thus failure to implement in the view 
of Henchy J would imply a situation where rights have not yet been operationalised. 
In this type of situation there is no statute or common law available to regulate their 
use or “prohibit an anticipated infringement or to compensate for a past one”.75 
Consequently, the onus would lie on the state to operationalise the framework for 
regulation.   
Individually and collectively the three points reinforce the understanding of 
the phrase “failure to implement” to mean the absence of a statutory and common law 
regulatory framework. Therefore, the thesis here is that Henchy J far from signalling 
disenchantment and the desire to abandon or suspend direct horizontality, emphasised 
and entrenched direct horizontality in Ireland’s constitutional jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, and as a necessary implication of this, the phrase “failure to implement” 
suggests an approach unique and separate from indirect horizontality as represented 
by the phrase “plainly inadequate”. Consequently, the question of Irish courts seeking 
the establishment of a higher than normal threshold in relation to direct horizontality 
does not arise at all. 
In a sense, it is perhaps to be expected that judgments will invariably be based 
on direct horizontality in that it is unreasonable to expect courts to discuss 
horizontality in all its aspects in the abstract. Ireland has an adversarial judicial system 
and thus courts act when substantive legal issues are placed before them in concrete 
form. Courts can only deal with matters that are brought before them and the 
corresponding burden of instituting legal proceedings and setting the agenda for the 
court lies with the Bar. As a result, courts will only discuss the alternative approach of 
indirect horizontality and give detailed views or guidelines on it so long as they are 
asked to consider indirect horizontality in a concrete factual situation. An assumption 
may therefore rightly be made that the depth and breadth of discussion a court invests 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
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on any given case will to some significant extent depend on the rigour and robustness 
of research that advocates submit before the court.  
Alternatively members of the Bar may reasonably feel that actions based on 
indirect horizontality will not succeed at all. On this account, some practitioners may 
opt to frame court actions on the basis of direct horizontality and thus seek safer ways 
of attaining the desired result for their clients.76 However, this is different from 
suggesting that courts in Ireland will not accept arguments based on indirect 
horizontality. 
 
Indirect Horizontality: An Established but Neglected Approach in Irish Law 
O’Cinneide has made a couple of observations in relation to indirect 
horizontality. First, that courts in Ireland have not opened up or opened up fully to the 
alternative approach of indirect horizontality and any potential attempt to persuade the 
courts to use it faces “the conservative approach to existing common law that has 
been adopted by the Supreme Court”.77 A consequence of this lack of openness, it is 
argued, is a stale jurisprudence that does not comport with constitutional requirements 
nor is it sensitive to the needs of individuals in private relationships.78 Secondly, that 
in Irish law there “is little sign of indirect horizontal effect being evidenced in the 
evolution of private law remedies”.79 While the latter view may be justified the 
former may not because courts in Ireland have certainly opened up to indirect 
horizontality. As noted the judgment by Henchy J in Hanrahan stipulates that 
intervention can be made by courts on the basis of indirect horizontality – where it
established that there is “plainly inadequate” 
 is 
in private law.  
                                                
In order to appreciate that Irish courts have acknowledged the role of indirect 
horizontality on Irelands’ legal landscape and also to appreciate that “plain 
inadequacy” is equivalent to indirect horizontality two points may be emphasised. 
First, the phrase “plainly inadequate” must be read in conjunction with the following 
observation Henchy J made several sentences later in the passage which in fact is a 
classic description of indirect horizontality 
 
76 Since I do not have empirical evidence I am assuming that actions were framed on the basis of direct 
horizontality. 
77 Colm O’Cinneide, Taking Horizontal Effect Seriously, note 1, 90. 
78 Ibid and Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law, note 1, 
79 Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law, ibid, 243. 
 
 23
[B]ut when he founds his action on an existing tort he is normally confined to the limitations 
of that tort. It might be different if it could be shown that the tort in question is basically 
ineffective to protect his constitutional right. But that is not alleged here.80[Emphasis added] 
 
Secondly, the argument that courts have unreservedly opened up to indirect 
horizontality may indirectly be reinforced by the endorsement of Henchy J by 
Costello J in W v Ireland (N0. 2).81 Indeed McMahon and Binchy note that the courts 
after having found the task of dealing with the implications of choosing direct 
horizontality unpalatable 
Instead …have sought to mitigate its practical effects by looking to the pre-existing law as the 
medium through which the constitutional remedy should be channelled in most cases.82 
 
The next logical question then would be why has indirect horizontality not 
been an active feature in the shaping of private common law on the legal landscape of 
Ireland? First this is an issue that can be addressed by the practical endeavours of the 
Bar and the scholarly efforts of lawyers. Commenting on a similar situation in the 
South African context Christopher Roederer explains 
The question whether the common law and its development comport with the values of the 
Bill of Rights is a thorny and contentious one. Without the aid of good advocacy it is 
understandably difficult for judges in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal to address 
the issue adequately (particularly given their heavy case load, the conventions of an 
adversarial system and the fact that they do not have their own researchers). Nonetheless, the 
duty ... remains.83 
 
In the Irish context research by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties makes 
similar general observations as regards the limitations that judges face and that these 
realities impact adversely on judicial activity in general.84 Consequently good and 
informed advocacy is a sine qua non for the development of a vibrant and effective 
                                                 
80 Note 1, 636. The phrase “basically ineffective” is here understood as similar to “plainly inadequate”. 
81 Note 71,167 and 168  
82 McMahon & Binchy, note 1, para 1.60 
83 Christopher Roederer, The Transformation of South African Private Law After Ten Years of 
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Rights L. R., (2006) 447, note 263 quotes C. J. Roederer, Law of Delict, in 2000 Annual Survey of 
South African Law, 281, 282. It has of course to be acknowledged clearly that the members of the Bar 
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84 Irish Council for Civil Liberties (Tanya Ward), Justice Matters: Independence Accountability and 
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indirect horizontal approach. As asserted, progress on this will ultimately depend on 
fruitful interaction between the strong publics (the courts and the bar) and weak 
publics (legal scholars).85 It is only by having a well informed strong publics that 
indirect horizontality will have a visible impact on positive common law. 
Secondly, regarding the argument that indirect horizontality is not actively 
pursued, it is submitted that this can in part be explained by the conflation of direct 
and indirect horizontality through the making of the distinction between the two 
approaches subtle. Furthermore, this conflation emanates from both judicial and 
scholarly efforts. The Supreme Court has clearly stated in Hanrahan that it would use 
horizontality where it is established that there is “failure to implement” or where 
there is “plainly inadequate”. The observation about conflation and unnecessary 
subtlety can again be properly appreciated in the context of the court’s discussion of 
these key phrases as condition precedents which will prompt a court to engage into 
intervention mode on the basis of horizontality. Unfortunately, it is in the elaboration 
of these phrases that conflation has occurred.  
While there is recognition that horizontality has two strands in its most basic 
form, direct and indirect, it seems that there has been an omission to clearly and 
unambiguously relate these strands to the key phrases in the statement by Henchy J. 
Thus, “plainly inadequate” must be clearly linked to indirect horizontality and must 
be understood as the basis for court intervention in an existing private law situation.  
At the very least, courts have not explained indirect horizontality to the same 
extent as direct horizontality and have also not made explicit the link and the 
distinction between direct and indirect horizontality. The remarks of Costello J in the 
case of W. v Ireland (N0.2) are an example of failure to link “plainly inadequate” to 
indirect horizontality. Costello J omitted to point out expressly in his taxonomy that 
private common law regimes may be a source of infringement hence the need for 
indirect horizontality.86 Similarly, courts have not made any serious attempt to 
explain the circumstances where courts will intervene on account of inadequacy in the 
                                                 
85 See Nancy Frazer, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy, in Craig Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere, (MIT Press, 1992), 109- 142 and 
Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “post-Socialist” Condition, Routeledge, 1997, p. 90 for 
a discussion of the practical usefulness of the concepts of weak and strong publics. Weak publics are 
understood as fora or sites in society where opinion making is generated and discussion is had but 
nonetheless do not have binding decision making powers. Strong publics on the one hand are fora or 
sites in society which engage in both opinion making as well as concrete decision-making which 
impacts on real lives. 
86 McMahon & Binchy, note 1, para 1.70 
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common law regime. What appears to be missing is an attempt to produce guiding 
principles. An example of failure to elaborate clearly circumstances indirect 
horizontality will apply as opposed to direct horizontality is provided by the remarks 
of Costello J in Phillip Hosford.87 Equally, in this case Costello J does not allude to 
the possibility that private common law rules may themselves be the source of 
infringement. In such a situation a constitutional right through indirect horizontality 
would shape or modify the common law rule so that it conforms to constitutional 
requirements. Costello J acknowledges the non-availability of damages at common 
law in the case but from a remedial point of view appears to only focus on explaining 
the circumstances direct horizontality can be invoked. In other words, indirect 
horizontality may equally be invoked in similar circumstances.   
Moreover, it appears that scholarly endeavour may possibly be complicit in 
the conflation of direct with indirect horizontality and also in contributing to the lack 
of profile of indirect horizontality.88 Anecdotally, scholars have projected the view 
that courts will generally not want to interfere with private law in its regulatory 
functions on the basis of human rights.89 The premise of this view is that although 
private law has some limitations in that its prescriptions may breach the common 
sense of justice it is nevertheless the best tool for regulating private relations. 
Consequently, a legal strategy that attacks private law will succeed only in very 
“exceptional circumstances” which appear to be understood as “rare circumstances”. 
In other words, “plainly inadequate” and “basically ineffective” are construed as 
corresponding to “rare circumstances”. The cases of Hanrahan, W v Ireland and 
McDonnell v Ireland are thus cited to reinforce this perspective and interestingly to 
support the view that they are representative of current judicial discourse on 
horizontality. Colm O’Cinneide clearly building on this perspective notes 
Well established private law rules, whether common law or legislative in origin are presumed 
to be consistent with constitutional norms: Only in exceptional circumstances will they be 
subject to constitutional scrutiny, and horizontal effect will only come into play where the 
                                                 
87 Note 11, 303. See Costello’s remarks quoted at note 26.   
88 With the exception of Binchy, note 1. 
89 On the basis of anecdotal evidence it would seem to that this view is particularly entrenched and that 
this reluctance is a feature across the board on the Irish legal landscape. Gerry Whyte, note 40 
reinforces this observation and notes that the “view that our [Irish] Constitution sets its face against 
judicial activism of this nature is so ingrained among many sections of the legal profession”.  D.G. 
Morgan note 39 (on judicial activism) and the very existence of horizontality suggest a more nuanced 
view ought to be held.  
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existing private law is clearly and manifestly out of line with the constitution.90 [Emphasis 
added]   
 
Thus post Hanrahan the implication communicated is that, first, after rowing 
back from the earlier gains prior to the 1990s 
The Irish courts have showed greater caution in applying constitutional rights in the private 
sphere, where existing private law clearly regulates a matter within the scope of application of 
a constitutional right.91    
 
Secondly, that the basis for intervention has been toughened by requiring litigants to 
satisfy a higher than normal threshold, “plainly inadequate”, in order to convince the 
courts to act on the basis of horizontality 
In general, the Irish courts tend to adopt an approach based upon deference towards existing 
private law positions, which Hanrahan reinforces by apparently sealing off well-developed 
areas of private law from the influence and impact of constitutional norms92 
 
However, the picture sketched of the Irish Court’s attitude to indirect 
horizontality may be challenged in that it conflates direct with indirect horizontality. 
If the implication of the first point is that indirect horizontality had been used prior to 
the 1990s, it is submitted that it is inaccurate and confuses the two approaches to 
horizontality hence the conflation. Irish courts prior to Hanrahan did not employ 
indirect horizontality.93 Rather it is direct horizontality that courts used. This 
observation is further reinforced by Henchy J  
So far as I am aware, the constitutional provisions relied on have never been used in the courts 
to shape the form of any existing tort or to change the normal onus of proof94 
 
On the second point, the construction of the statement by Henchy J in this way 
suggests that there is no recognition of its nuanced nature. The judgment of Henchy J 
                                                 
90 Colm O’Cinneide, Irish Constitutional Law, note 1, 236 
91 Ibid, 
92 Ibid, 243. The judgements in Hanrahan, McDonnell and W v Ireland are pointed at as evidence of 
this tendency. Curiously O’Cinneide indicates that he does not necessarily see anything fundamentally 
wrong with the manner in which the courts have dealt with these cases. Colm O’Cinneide, Irish 
Constitutional Law, note 1, 236 footnote 93 
93 Educational Co. of Ireland v Fitzpatrick (N0.2) [1961] IR 345; Byrne v Ireland [1972] IR 241; 
Meskell v C.I.E [1973] IR 121 and Murtagh Properties Ltd v Cleary [1972] IR 330. The exception 
appears to be Burke and O’Reilly v Burke and Quail [1951] IR 216; Re Blake [1955] IR 69; 
94 Direct horizontality has been employed where in fact there was no common law or statutory law 
framework in operation. Costello J in Phillip Hosford note 11, 305 illustrates this point. 
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is taken as a broad statement of intention on the part of the judiciary to toughen the 
criteria for entertaining claims made on the basis of horizontality-understood as direct 
horizontality. However, the identification of “plainly inadequate” in the existing law 
is not necessarily intended by Henchy J to be a condition precedent for direct 
horizontality. Of course it is possible to interpret “plainly inadequate” as a condition 
precedent for direct horizontality in that a court could opt for the development of an 
independent and elaborate direct horizontality which would run alongside or replace 
the existing specific common law rule. However, (as argued above) it is submitted 
this is not the sense in which, Henchy J should be construed nor did he intend to be 
understood.95 “plainly inadequate” represents an approach in its own right. To put it 
differently, in situations where private law is well established but nonetheless is in 
breach of constitutional rights courts have since expressed a preference for indirect 
horizontality as opposed to direct horizontality as demonstrated by the remarks of the 
Supreme Court in Hanrahan and McDonnell v Ireland. It is therefore crucial for the 
development of the doctrine of horizontality that clarity be brought to bear on the 
phrases “failure to implement” and “plainly inadequate” as representing two very 
different, equally useful and applicable approaches – direct and indirect horizontality.  
Similarly, an implication arises that it is in relation to indirect horizontality 
that a higher than normal threshold is required since “plainly inadequate” is in fact 
indirect horizontality. This line of argument is equally not persuasive. It is merely 
speculative to suggest that it is established within the judicial ranks that attacks on 
private law will succeed only in “exceptional” or “rare” circumstances. Henchy J 
neither passes any value judgment on whether recognition of indirect horizontality is a 
good thing nor does he give guidelines on the nature or level of the threshold that 
needs satisfaction. Indeed no value judgment is given by the pronouncement of 
Henchy J 
[I]t might be different if it could be shown that the tort in question is basically ineffective to 
protect his constitutional right96 
 
“plainly inadequate” or “basically ineffective” do not carry any extra-ordinary 
meaning beyond what they represent in common parlance. As pointed out Henchy J 
rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments on the basis that the plaintiffs did not exhaust the 
                                                 
95 The discussion on direct horizontality above has suggested that direct horizontality is not intended to 
run alongside or to replace the common law. 
96 Note 1, 636 
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private law options available to them and also that concession of the plaintiffs’ 
argument would be fundamentally unjust to the defendant in the specific 
circumstances of the case.97 Alternatively it may be argued that the plaintiff in 
Hanrahan was seeking change in the rules of procedure as opposed to alteration in the 
substance of tort law. The alleged inadequacy was identified in the rules of evidence 
as opposed to the substance of tort law. It is, therefore, suggested that it is 
inappropriate to use Hanrahan as evidence of judicial unwillingness to intervene, on 
the basis of “plainly inadequate”, in cases where there is an established private law 
framework. The passage by Henchy J and its constituent parts indicate nothing else 
other than the mere statement of ‘brute facts’.98  
Finally, it is clear “plainly inadequate” as a term of legal and judicial art has 
not been epistemically explained by the Irish Courts and inevitably the judgments beg 
the analytical question as regards indirect horizontality.99 Similarly Barrington J in 
McDonnell v Ireland and Costello J in Hosford fall short of elaborating in cogent 
abstract terms what adequacy or inadequacy entails.100 A possible way of resolving 
this would be to look beyond the Irish jurisdiction – admittedly this requires more 
discussion than space allows in this instance. The judgment of O’Regan J in Kern CC 
may provide guidance and ground for debate on the meaning of “plainly inadequate” 
as a term of art in legal and judicial circles.101 
O’Regan specifically addressed the question under what circumstances or 
when the common law may be altered in the context of the constitutional requirement 
under section 39 (2) of the South African Constitution102 and adopted the view of her 
fellow South African Constitutional Court Judge Moseneke J. expressed in S v Thebus 
                                                 
97 See discussion on note … 
98 Eric Barnes, Explaining Brute Facts PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of 
Science Association, Vol. 1994, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1994), 61-68, University of Chicago 
Press 
99 On the legal significance and the illustration of a term of art in law see Molzof v. United States, 502 
U.S. 301, 112 S. Ct. 711, 116 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1992). McMahon & Binchy, note 1 and Binchy, note 1 
have speculatively put across a possible way of interpreting “plainly inadequate” in the context of the 
words of Henchy J in Hanrahan.  
100 In Hosford a justification Costello J used was that ‘the common law does not permit recovery of 
damages for the deprivation of the non-pecuniary benefits which derive from the parent-child 
relationship”. This is very unsatisfactory since he was dealing with the Constitution and thus his 
judgment still begs the analytical question.  
101 Kern CC note 33. 
102 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act N0. 108 of 1996. S 39 (2) provides “When 
interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. For a discussion of 
the operation on indirect horizontality see Sibo Banda, note 58 and Johan van der Walt, note 5. 
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and Another.103 A rule of the common law may be altered either when it is 
inconsistent with a provision of the Constitution or it is consistent with a specific 
constitutional provision but is nevertheless out of step with the spirit, purport, and 
objects of the Constitution.104 Furthermore, O’Regan explained and distinguished the 
meaning of the “incremental” development of the common law through the principle 
of precedent.105 She clarified the “development” of the common law under the 
Constitution in light of section 39 (2) as: first, the removal of those aspects of the 
common law that are inconsistent with the Constitution; and, second, the “infusion” of 
the normative values of the Constitution into an adjudicative process “when some 
startling new development of the common law was in issue.” She explained that this 
involved the grafting of such constitutional normative values onto the customary 
process of incremental development of the common law.106 
 
Discourse on Horizontality: Time to Address the Analytical Problem in Judicial 
Pronouncements  
The cases on the doctrine of horizontality in Ireland do not subject the doctrine 
to an analysis of an exacting nature. Specifically the courts in these cases did not 
consider clearly, broadly and deeply in relation to rights, the variety of conceptual 
approaches, normative requirements and the jurisdictional implications of the doctrine 
on private legal adjudication. The doctrine demands analytical attention from a 
potential range of perspectives including the nature of a right, its scope and its 
efficacy and practicability. The constitution incorporates a variety of rights which 
potentially demand different treatment along these factorial considerations. Indeed 
much that is known of the doctrines’ potential reach in Ireland is the result of 
academic speculation. It is therefore essential that courts begin to give the required 
clarity on this matter. 
A legitimate point may be made that it is not the duty of courts to engage in 
lofty abstract analysis but to resolve disputes in the most practicable and satisfactory 
manner possible.107 In other words, it is to scholars that we should look to and from 
                                                 
103 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) at para 28 and Kern CC note 33, para 16.  
104 Kern CC note 33, para 16.  
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid, para 17. 
107 A less generous view of academics is that academics as opposed to judges appear to have the luxury 
of time for reflection, the luxury of the knowledge that their ideas and actions will not have immediacy 
of impact (the burden of responsibility), academics can produce, with a straight face, theories which 
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whom we ought to expect the performance of this task. While it is correct, for a 
variety of practical reasons, to suggest that scholars should bear this burden it is 
persuasive that courts should equally be conversant with developments in legal theory 
and analysis and should also play a lead role in the development of frameworks for 
analysis. Judges are appointed to high office on the basis that they are reservoirs of 
legal knowledge and skill acquired over a lifetime of practice and reflection. 
Consequently, there is an underlying assumption that judges are familiar with the 
intricacies of legal theory and its links to practical issues and are assumed to have a 
steady hand with which they deal with these issues. 
It cannot be disputed that courts require a taxonomy which imparts legitimacy 
on the adjudicative practices of courts. A taxonomy ensures consistency and 
consistency is an important value in adjudicative practices. For example lawyers 
assume that an inconsistent pronouncement of legal principles leads to loss of 
confidence in the judiciary.108 A taxonomy also make the job of judging easier since it 
enables judges to locate gaps or inadequacies in the positive law and to identify 
applicable legal principles and rules. In turn these lead to the determination of 
appropriate and commonly acceptable forms of redress. Oona Hathaway makes 
similar observations on stare decisis in her study of path dependence in common law 
legal circles 
Path dependence theory [read taxonomy] has relevance for both legal scholarship and legal 
practice. It guides legal practitioners to concentrate their resources on altering the path of law 
and it provides a new basis for scholars to question and refine the doctrine of stare decisis 
which creates the law’s path dependent character.109  
 
Ultimately progress on horizontality depends on the reaction by the strong publics, the 
courts and the bar, to discussion and commentary made by weak publics, the 
academics.110 Ideas of scholars require to be taken on board by the publics that 
matter, the strong publics, so that the production of new knowledge by scholars do
not become a futile and purposeless exerci
es 
se. 
                                                                                                                                            
others have dubbed “micky mouse theories” on account of their apparent irrelevance to real people. 
Relatively academics appear to have the resources to put into effect or publicise their ideas with little 
regard for impact. Judges and advocates cannot avoid responsibility or engage in “trivialities” and they 
have to account for their actions to real people. 
108 See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, (Revised ed, Yale University Press, 1964). 
109 Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System (2001) 86 Iowa L.R. 601, 605 [Emphasis added] 
110 See Nancy Frazer, note 85. 
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Since the early 1990s judges have made attempts to correct the apparent lack 
of analytical depth in the judgments on horizontality by exacting specific aspects of 
constitutional rights to abstract analysis. For instance, one can assess the observation 
made by Costello J. in W v Ireland (No.2) as an attempt to analyse the issues of 
efficacy or practicability of a fundamental right as a question of “judicial choice” of a 
particular mode or approach to the enforcement of rights.111 The question of “judicial 
choice” here indicates that the courts have an option to fashion a remedy through 
direct horizontality tort or to develop an existing common law tort structure through 
indirect horizontality.  
There are also instances where courts have failed to subject to rigorous and 
compelling analysis the grounds for their decisions to apply or to refuse to apply 
constitutional rights horizontally. It is acknowledged however, that this is an area of 
law that will generate divided opinion – just as virtually any other area of law does. 
One can identify as lacking analytical clarity the question of the scope of rights in 
private relationships. Siobhan Mullally observes that Irish courts have dealt 
unsatisfactorily with the application of principles of constitutional justice to private 
relationships and points to Carna Foods Ltd as a case in point.112 Margulies questions 
why the court in Carna Foods Ltd did not adopt the basis of the decision in Glover v 
B.L.N Ltd.113  Similarly, courts appear to adopt a blanket denial as opposed to a 
nuanced approach to the idea that the equality clause, Article 40.1, has effect in 
private relationships.114 Often in liberal democracies the dominant view holds that the 
scope fundamental rights have is limited by the extent to which they threaten to 
interfere with an individual’s autonomy.115 Exceptions, however, may be tolerated in 
many areas of private law including the right not to be discriminated against.116 A 
number of jurisdictions will tolerate encroachment upon an individual’s autonomy 
                                                 
111 Note 71.  
112 See Siobhan Mullally, note 49; [1995] 1 IR 526 (HC) as per McCracken J and [1997] 2 ILRM 499 
(SC) as per Lynch J.  
113 [1973] IR 388 and Margulies, note 51.   
114 Mullally, note 49. Dissatisfaction is also expressed in relation to the interpretation of the 
constitutional equality guarantee and critics cite The Constitution Review Group’s recommendation 
against extending the equality guarantee in Article 40.1 of the Irish Constitution. 
http://www.constitution.ie/reports/crg.pdf  
115 Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, (Havard University Press 1995) and Rick Bigwood, 
Contracts by Unfair Advantage: From Exploitation to Transactional Neglect, (2005) 25 OJLS 65.  
116 Paul Rishworth, Taking Human Rights into the Private Sphere, in D. Oliver and J. Fedtke (eds), note 
1 and Amnon Reichman, Property Rights, Public Policy and the Limits of the Legal Power to 
Discriminate, in D. Friedman & D. Barak-Erez (eds.) note 4. 
 32
only to the extent that the transaction in question is animated with a publicly 
recognised social interest.117  
Significantly, the pre-1990 Irish cases on horizontality do not outline any or 
analytically persuasive guidelines by which horizontality may be addressed as in the 
manner Peter Benson envisaged in writing about courts in Canada 
The courts did not devise a classification of the different ways of conceiving the relation 
between private law and basic human rights118  
 
The courts in Ireland have not to date come up with coherent and analytically 
persuasive explanations of horizontality from conceptual, juridical and jurisdictional 
perspectives. To borrow from Hogan and Whyte the doctrine of horizontality 
Marked – unfortunately from the point of view of one attempting a systematic exposition of an 
organic law – by a certain blurring of definition, a certain bursting of conceptual banks119 
  
The “bursting of conceptual banks”, mirrors the state of praxis and 
commentary in Ireland pertaining to horizontality. Binchy observes that there is an 
absence of normative unity and coherence in the judgements meted out.120 From a 
scholarly perspective laudable, important and groundbreaking work has previously 
been done which will make the burden of future work less daunting. Recognition has 
to be made of the work by McMahon and Binchy; Binchy; Forde, O’Cinneide and 
Margulies. Special recognition must be made of McMahon and Binchy who have set 
the pace and made a proactive attempt to suggest ways of developing some 
coherence.121 However a lot of work on this still needs to be done and no doubt new 
problems hitherto unknown will continue to raise their heads. The words of Peter 
Benson are apposite here 
It is not satisfactory merely to collect instances where norms of [human rights] have been 
applied to private transactions or where individuals have successfully brought claims against 
others for breach of such norms. The crucial issue is conceptual: how are such claims to be 
                                                 
117 Paul Rishworth discusses New Zealand ibid; Amnon Reichman and Lorraine E. Weinrib and Ernest 
J. Weinrib, Constitutional Values and Private Law in Canada, in D. Friedman & D. Barak-Erez (eds.) 
ibid discuss Canada. 
118 See Peter Benson, note 4, 201 
119 Gerard Hogan and Gerard Whyte, note 13, para 7.3.53. They make this observation in relation to the 
doctrine of unenumerated constitutional rights.  
120 William Binchy, note 1 at p. 205 
121 Ibid. McMahon & Binchy, note 1, paras 1.66-1.70. 
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conceived? Do they display the fundamental and distinctive character [of normative (-ness) 
that private law is claimed to have?]122 
 
Conclusion 
As Loraine and Ernest Weinrib observe the nature of private law is a matter of 
considerable contestation with divisions in perspectives established along the line 
“between those who see private law non-instrumentally as the juridical realisation of 
corrective justice and those who see it instrumentally as the vehicle for promoting 
economic efficiency.”123 It is submitted that the ideal of justice as personal dignity be 
added as a further point of departure in this debate particularly in the context of 
contemporary Irish law and society.   
In juridical or normative terms the technical elaboration of the doctrine of 
horizontality within the legal system – its configuration, prescriptive nature and 
limitations in relation to the individual’s autonomy – sets the stage for heated debates 
linked to the division between the public and the private domains of law. 
Jurisdictionally, it is significant that the Irish Constitution does not expressly 
authorise the courts to apply the Fundamental Rights horizontally and that it is the 
courts which have staked ground for such application. For formalists (literalists) this 
is a discomforting feature and an example of creeping judicial activism which is 
ultimately corrosive of the doctrine of separation of powers. Furthermore, there are 
problems about legitimacy of action that intrudes on individual autonomy as between 
the legislature and the judiciary.  
Conceptually the jurisprudence of horizontality has benefited from the with 
deep reflection of McMahon and Binchy, Binchy and O’Cinneide in terms of the 
approaches available to it and the normative circumstances of that give rise to its 
invocation. As a tentative and preliminary step towards further addressing this I have 
built upon the work of McMahon and Binchy, Binchy and O’Cinneide and attempted 
to re-examine the pronouncements made by courts in Ireland on the meaning of 
horizontality in the Irish legal system and to suggest openness to developments in 
other jurisdictions. My main argument has been that Ireland in common with a few 
other jurisdictions uniquely retains both the direct and the indirect approaches to the 
doctrine of horizontality. It is my contention that this elucidation is merely the easy 
                                                 
122 See Peter Benson Benson, note 4, 201 at 202 [Emphasis and bracketed words added] 
123 Lorraine and Ernest Weinrib note 117. 
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spade work while, as Binchy notes perceptively, the hard work lies ahead in sorting 
out the conceptual, normative and jurisdictional questions.  
A possible way of addressing this is to re-examine past cases on private law 
and to highlight the opportunities that have been lost regarding the application of 
rights horizontally. An objective of this approach would be to develop a sophisticated 
Irish and comparative body of knowledge which the strong publics – advocates and 
the courts – would tap in to from time to time. This body of knowledge ideally would 
deepen the understanding of the nature, scope and efficacy of horizontality and lead to 
the appreciation of the uniqueness, importance and potential advantage the doctrine of 
horizontality may bring to the legal adjudication of private law in Ireland.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
